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This Article addresses the argument that certain aspects of copyright law violate 
the First Amendment—an argument numerous copyright and constitutional law 
scholars advance—from a historical perspective.1  The Federal Courts have largely 
rejected versions of this argument, although in the wake of the Eldred v. Ashcroft 
decision there is some small indication that they are more willing to apply First 
Amendment doctrine to copyright cases.2  Most of the literature addressing the 
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 1. See generally C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 
(2002); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1275 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech:  Why 
the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2003); Robert C. Denicola, 
Copyright and Free Speech:  Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. 
REV. 283 (1979); Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169 (2007); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 
983 (1970); Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 
(2009), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/horowitz-free-speech-theory.pdf; Lawence Lessig, 
Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); David McGowan, Why the First 
Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004); Neil W. Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (196); Neil W. Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does 
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 
1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) 
[hereinafter Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use]; Note, “Recoding” and the Derivative 
Works Entitlement:  Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1488 (2006); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and how Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive 
Copyright Claims, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 673 (2003). 
 2. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  See also Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 
2010) (analyzing whether the Uruguay Round Agreements Act violates the First Amendment); Kahle v. 
Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing whether renewal and extension provisions of the 
Copyright Renewal Act and the Copyright Term Extension Act trigger First Amendment scrutiny).  For 
cases denying the application of First Amendment principles to copyright law, see Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We have repeatedly rejected 
First Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground that First 
Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine.”); L.A. News Serv. v. 
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relationship between copyright law and the First Amendment approaches the 
question from either a doctrinal or an originalist perspective.3  Both perspectives 
face large problems.  The doctrinal angle must contend with the large body of case 
law refusing to apply the First Amendment to copyright infringement suits, while 
the originalist perspective struggles with the lack of evidence of the intent of the 
ratifiers with respect to the relationship between the two clauses.  In response to 
these two approaches, this Article argues that in order to understand the current 
tension between the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause, it is necessary to 
go beyond the founding generation and investigate the way both copyright and the 
First Amendment were transformed by the generation that lived through the period 
surrounding the Civil War and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.4  Furthermore, 
because of the importance of historical struggles to the interpretation of the First 
Amendment, it is helpful to step outside the courtroom in order to understand the 
values that animate the Free Speech Clause.5  An understanding of this history 
 
Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (“First Amendment concerns are also addressed in the 
copyright field through the ‘fair use’ doctrine.”).  See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–79 
(1977); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 
F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997);  New Era Publ’ns Inter., Aps v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 584 
(2nd Cir. 1989); Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2nd Cir. 1986); Fisher v. Dees, 
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099–1100 (2nd Cir. 1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 
F.2d 751, 758–59 (9th Cir. 1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 
(2nd Cir. 1966) (Lumbard and Hays, JJ., concurring); Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).  Faced with the sheer weight of cases 
rejecting First Amendment challenges to copyright, some scholars have recently begun to look to other 
sections of the Constitution to limit copyright’s expansion.  See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating 
Copyright:  Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010). 
 3. For articles addressing the issue from a doctrinal perspective see, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 
1; Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:  Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).  
For articles addressing the issue from an originalist perspective see, e.g., Thomas Nachbar, Intellectual 
Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004).  See also Dotan Oliar, Making 
Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:  Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s 
Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2005) (addressing the Copyright Clause’s internal 
limits). 
 4. Rather than primarily focusing on Supreme Court cases that interpret the Constitution, a task 
that has already been accomplished ably by others, this Article applies Professor Philip Bobbitt’s 
method of Constitutional interpretation to the problem.  Professor Bobbitt views arguments from case 
law as only one way, among many, to extract meaning from the Constitution.  In addition to parsing case 
law, Professor Bobbitt advocates examining the text of the Constitution, the history of its ratification and 
the structures of governance that the Constitution sets up.  PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–8 (1982).  This methodology differs from originalism in that it does 
not privilege the intentions of the Founders over the ratifiers, and that it does not privilege the original 
framers of the Constitution over framers of later amendments to the Constitution. 
 5. Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob:  Free 
Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1109, 1115, 1179 (1996) (“Today, as lawyers, law teachers, and law students we generally think of free-
speech issues as matters decided by courts.  The Lovejoy experience shows that free speech is a much 
broader political tradition and that crucial free-speech decisions are made by citizens, by the press, by 
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clarifies the constitutional values embodied in the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment, and thus offers textual and historical grounding for the arguments that 
there is a tension between the two clauses that must be reconciled. 
Briefly, after examining how the animating values of the two clauses diverged 
during the Nineteenth Century, this Article concludes that the Supreme Court is 
correct to hold that the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment coexist largely 
in peace, as the Copyright Clause is the “engine of free expression.”6  However, 
contrary to the Court’s originalist bent, the time period relevant to determining 
whether copyright was to function as an engine of free speech is not the founding 
of the Republic, but rather the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  During 
this time, as freedom of speech was reconceptualized to protect a core right to 
speak publicly, theories of copyright were gaining hold that would make more and 
more speech private property.  An examination of the changes undergone by the 
values underlying the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment during the 
crucial Civil War period partially vindicates the Supreme Court’s reading of the 
two clauses.  This history also clarifies the circumstances under which enforcement 
of laws passed under the authority of the Copyright Clause may violate the First 
Amendment.  Rather than supporting the Court’s holding that copyright laws must 
undergo First Amendment scrutiny when they go beyond the historical “core of 
copyright protection,” the history analyzed in this Article supports the argument 
that copyright laws must undergo heightened First Amendment scrutiny when they 
encroach on the core of speech protected by the First Amendment.  This Article 
also suggests that given the difficulty in using the blunt nature of remedies 
available to Federal Courts’ in copyright cases and the difficulties involved in 
reconciling the post Civil War Clauses, the Copyright Clause imposes a duty on 
lawmakers to use the copyright power in a way that preserves a vibrant and open 
public forum. 
One might object to this historical approach by arguing that since copyright and 
free speech were not seen as conflicting during the Nineteenth Century, that period 
should not be relevant to the current conflict.7  It is true that the relationship 
between the two clauses was first investigated by scholars in the 1970’s and only 
became a popular topic after the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension 
Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.8  However, while the 
current interest in the conflict has been sparked by the conjunction of a recent 
expansion of copyright protection and the development of technological 
innovations that make it much easier to infringe these expanded rights, the 
 
legislators, and by public officials who are not judges.”) [hereinafter Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah 
Lovejoy]; Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 30–31. 
 6. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558). 
 7. Commentators sometimes state in passing that there was no conflict between the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Clause during the Nineteenth Century.  See, e.g., Patterson, Free Speech, 
Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 33 (“The American copyright of the nineteenth century did not 
create free speech problems.  No problems arose partly because free speech doctrines remained 
undeveloped and partly because statutory copyright required publication and, therefore, dissemination of 
the copyrighted work regardless of its content.”). 
 8. See the publication dates of articles cited supra note 1. 
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constitutional values that make possible both the modern expansion of copyright 
and a broader, more libertarian reading of the First Amendment date from the 
historical period examined in this Article. 
The current debate—which for the most part focuses on the values at the time of 
the founding, the current doctrine interpreting the two clauses, and current policy 
concerns—will benefit from an investigation of the period of time when the values 
underlying the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause diverged.  In short, even 
though the two conditions necessary to precipitate a crisis between copyright and 
the First Amendment—new copying technology and a more expansive copyright—
were not in place during the period surrounding the Civil War, that period was the 
critical constitutional moment where the values underlying the two clauses 
changed, and thus is relevant to the current debate. 
The First Part of this Article explains the peaceful relationship between 
copyright and the First Amendment at the founding.  The Second Part explains how 
the values underlying the two clauses diverged during the Civil War generation.  
The Third Part asks whether the Supreme Court’s theory that the Copyright Clause 
was designed to function as an “engine” for the marketplace of ideas is an accurate 
understanding of the relationship between the two clauses.9  Finally, Part Four 
briefly applies the result of this historical analysis to the current debate over how to 
reharmonize the clauses. 
I.  THE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AT THE FOUNDING 
It is sometimes stated that since the same Congress—a political body that 
included many of the framers of the Constitution—that drafted and voted for the 
First Amendment also approved the first Copyright Act, copyright and free speech 
must be compatible.10  Putting aside whether solely the proximity in time of these 
two laws immunizes copyright from First Amendment scrutiny, the intuition that 
underlies this statement is sound.  There is scant evidence that anyone at the 
founding seriously thought that the Copyright Clause, the first Copyright Act and 
the First Amendment were in serious conflict.11  This Section explores four reasons 
for their early peaceful coexistence. 
First, at the founding it was not entirely clear how expansive a copyright regime 
the Copyright Clause would permit.  The text of the Copyright Clause does not 
make it clear whether that clause embodies a natural rights theory of intellectual 
property or a utilitarian theory.12  If the Copyright Clause embodies a natural rights 
theory of intellectual property, it would authorize a more expansive copyright 
 
 9. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 9, 558 (1985). 
 10. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (“The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in 
time.  This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are 
compatible with free speech principles.”). 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
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regime that would pose a larger threat to Free Speech.13  A utilitarian theory would 
suggest a more limited copyright regime.14  Since the ratifiers of the Constitution 
did not take a firm position on which regime the Constitution sanctioned, they 
effectively passed the question of how much speech the copyright regime would be 
allowed to regulate on to later generations.  Second, to the extent that the ratifiers 
directly addressed the potential conflict between copyright and free speech, the 
argument that the preamble of the Copyright Clause was an internal pro free speech 
limitation won out.15  Third, copyright and the First Amendment were seen as 
contributing to the same project of enlightening the American people and 
developing a republican discourse about good government.16  Fourth, the ratifiers 
of the First Amendment did not contemplate that it would apply to laws that did not 
attempt to directly control speech.17  It is important to understand these four 
reasons why, initially, no one thought the Copyright Clause would conflict with the 
First Amendment in order to appreciate how later changes in the values embodied 
in the two clauses would create the potential for conflict. 
A.  THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 
The Copyright Clause did not solely embody one particular theory explaining 
why authors should be entitled to exclusive rights to their writings.  Philosophers of 
intellectual property often make a clean division between the natural rights 
justification for intellectual property and the utilitarian justification.18  To 
oversimplify, the natural rights theory argues that an author gains a property right 
in his creation, either by virtue of his intellectual labor, just as a landowner gains a 
property right in his land by virtue of his tilling the soil, or by virtue of the fact that 
his personality is expressed in the work.19  The utilitarian theory views rights 
granted by legislatures to authors as a balancing of costs and benefits that is 
justified only to the extent that it does more good than harm.20  Theoretically, a 
copyright regime based on a pure natural rights theory would recognize a perpetual 
copyright in the same way ownership of land in fee simple is theoretically 
perpetual.21  In contrast, a utilitarian system would narrowly tailor author rights so 
that they aligned with the public goals the legislature envisioned the copyright 
regime serving.22 
 
 13. See infra Parts II.B, IV. 
 14. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 21–
27 (2008). 
 15. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 16. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 17. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 18. For the natural rights justification, see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 
77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–329 (1988).  For the utilitarian justification, see BOYLE, supra note 14, at 17–27. 
 19. BOYLE, supra note 14, at 27–29; Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:  Copyright 
Protection for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1886 (1990). 
 20. BOYLE, supra note 14, at 22. 
 21. The Supreme Court rejected this logical conclusion of the natural rights theory of copyright in 
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). 
 22. BOYLE, supra note 14, at 21. 
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In the historical period surrounding the drafting of the Articles of Confederation 
and the Constitution, this utilitarian theory was often conceptualized in contractual 
terms.23  The State grants the author certain rights with respect to his work in 
exchange for providing the public with access to his writings.24  Many of the state 
copyright statutes that precede the Copyright Clause in the United States 
Constitution follow this contractual concept of copyright, as they include 
mechanisms that allow for compulsory licensing of the work if the author fails to 
make enough copies of it available to the public at a reasonable price.25  Some of 
the statutes also split the damages assessed against an infringer of a copyright 
between the author and the State—a scheme that looks more like it is regulating the 
book trade to ensure an adequate supply of publicly available works rather than 
recognizing property rights that exist as a matter of natural right.26 
However, the early authors that lobbied for copyright protection, and the 
legislatures that granted that protection, were unconstrained by such philosophical 
niceties.  They constructed regimes that borrowed freely from both theories.27  A 
brief selection of colonial copyright enactments shows that legislators made the 
same type of lawyerly kitchen sink arguments that lobbyists were making, mixing 
regulatory theories of public good with the plea that it would simply be unjust not 
to protect someone who has spent years working on a particular work.  The 
Confederate Congress committee charged with considering the problem of literary 
property and made up of James Madison, Hugh Williamson and Ralph Izard, 
reported that they were “persuaded that nothing is more properly a man’s own than 
the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of literary property would 
greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries and to the general 
extension of arts and commerce . . . .”28 
In the same vein, the preamble of the Massachusetts general copyright statute, 
enacted on March 17, 1783, is typical of most of the State copyright statutes passed 
pursuant to the Confederate Congress’s recommendation in its free use of both 
natural rights and utilitarian theories of intellectual property: 
Whereas the Improvement of Knowledge, the Progress of Civilization, the public 
Weal of the Community, and the Advancement of Human Happiness, greatly depend 
on the Efforts of learned and ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences; as 
the principle Encouragement of such Persons can have to make great and beneficial 
Exertions of this Nature must exist in the legal Security of the Fruits of their Study 
and Industry to themselves; and as such Security is one of the natural Rights of all 
Men, there being no Property more peculiarly a Man’s own than that which is 
 
 23. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 94, 122 (1967). 
 24. Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 60. 
 25. BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 94, 122. 
 26. See BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 118. 
 27. Professor Jane Ginsburg has shown that both theories were indeed in the intellectual drinking 
water at the time of the founding of the American intellectual property system.  Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of 
Two Copyrights, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1002–05 (1990). 
 28. BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 110. 
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produced by the Labour of his Mind . . . . 29 
The Massachusetts preamble clearly views the natural rights justification for 
intellectual property—“there being no Property more peculiarly a Man’s own than 
that which is produced by the Labour of his Mind”—and the utilitarian 
justification—“as the principle of Encouragement of such Persons can have to 
make great and beneficial Exertions of this Nature must exist in the legal Security 
of the Fruits of their Study and Industry to themselves”—as being mutually 
reinforcing, rather than at odds.30  All in all, twelve out of the thirteen States 
enacted Copyright statutes at the Confederate Congress’s urging.  Few were as long 
or as philosophical as Massachusetts’, but most of them included the same meshing 
of natural rights and utilitarian considerations.31 
The text of the Constitutional Copyright Clause evinces the same ambivalent 
attitude toward the theoretical justifications for copyright found in earlier 
Copyright enactments of the individual States.  On the one hand, the Clause limits 
the power of Congress to grant authors exclusive rights in their works for “limited 
times,” and only for the purpose of advancing the “Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts,” suggesting a utilitarian copyright regime.  On the other hand, it 
speaks of “securing the exclusive rights” of Authors, which could be read to imply 
that authors were already entitled to these rights in some form and that the 
Constitution was merely comfirming those rights and clarifying their limits.32  
While the founding generation was ambivalent about what theory supported 
copyright, it will become apparent that during the 1840s and 1850s the natural 
rights justification began to overtake the utilitarian justification in the minds of 
legislators, courts, and the people.33 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Connecticut’s preamble, which North Carolina, Georgia, New York and South Carolina 
copied more or less directly read: 
It is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of natural Equity and Justice, that every Author should 
be secured in receiving the Profits that may arise from the Sale of his Works, and such Security 
may encourage Men of Learning and Genius to publish their Writings; which may do Honor to 
their Country, and Service to Mankind. 
BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 108.  New Hampshire’s statute resembled Massachusetts’s more than 
Connecticut’s.  New Jersey’s was a slight variation on the Connecticut model.  Virginia passed a 
copyright bill, after Noah Webster lobbied both James Madison and George Washington, with wording 
very similar to the future Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution:   “for securing to the authors of 
literary works an exclusive property therein, for a limited time.”  BUGBEE supra note 23, at 110.  
Delaware was the only State not to pass a copyright statute.  Oren Bracha, Commentary on the 
Connecticut Copyright Statute 1783, in PRIMARY SOURCES IN COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer eds., 2008). 
 32. The argument that the Copyright Clause is declaratory was made in the first major copyright 
case to reach the Supreme Court.  See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834);  Oren Bracha, Owning 
Ideas:  A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 315 (June 2005) (unpublished J.S.D. 
dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with Harvard Law School Library, Harvard University) 
[hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas]. 
 33. See infra Part II.B.  Both the utilitarian and natural rights theories were still very much up in 
the air at the time of the 1831 amendment that extended the terms from two fourteen year terms to two 
twenty-eight year terms.  Speaking against the proposed retroactive term extension, Representative 
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B.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AT THE FOUNDING—THE PREAMBLE AND REPUBLICAN VALUES 
Though the ratifiers of the Constitution were ambivalent about the theoretical 
justifications for a copyright regime at the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution, the history of the relationship between copyright and free speech did 
cause some of them to question the free speech bona fides of the copyright clause.  
There was some anti-Federalist opposition to the Copyright Clause precisely 
because it was thought to endanger free speech.  Examining the Federalist response 
to this anti-Federalist argument sheds light on why the ratifiers ultimately thought 
the Copyright Clause did not endanger First Amendment values. 
1.  The Early Alliance Between Copyright and Censorship 
From their earliest days, copyright regimes have had a complex relationship 
with censorship.34  The first exclusive rights to print certain works were granted in 
Venice in 1474.35  In England, the Stationers’ Company was chartered by Queen 
Mary in 1556, receiving the exclusive right to print in England in exchange for the 
promise to not print anything the Crown did not want them to print.36  The 
symbiotic relationship between the printers and the Crown, which allowed the 
 
Hoffman characterized copyright as an implied contract between the public and the author:  “There was 
an implied contract between them [the author] and the public.  They, in virtue of their copyright, sold 
their books to the latter at an exorbitant rate; and the latter, therefore, had the right to avail themselves of 
the work, when the copyright expired.”  7 REG. DEB. 423 (1831).  Representative Verplanck defended 
the extension on pure natural rights reasoning: 
The whole [implied contract] argument was founded on a mistake, apparent to the eye of 
common sense, and repugnant to the law of the land.  There was no contract; the work of the 
author was the result of his own labor.  It was a right of property existing before the law of 
copyrights had been made.  That statute did not give the right, it only secured it; it provided a 
legal remedy for the infringement of the right, and that was the sum of it.  It was, he repeated, 
merely a legal provision for the protection of a natural right. 
Id. at 424. 
An exchange of letters between Daniel Webster, the most well-known lawyer of the time and defender 
of the natural rights justification for copyright as cocounsel in Wheaton v. Peters, and Noah Webster, the 
well-known advocate for strong copyright protection, reveals that while Daniel Webster in his capacity 
as a lawyer and Senator moved freely between defending perpetual copyright and a copyright limited in 
time, he personally believed that neither was precluded by the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.  In 
response to Noah Webster’s petition that he introduce a bill securing perpetual copyright, Daniel 
Webster admitted that he had his doubts as to the natural rights theory and the wisdom of perpetual 
copyright on policy grounds: 
Most people, I think, are as well satisfied (or better) with the reasoning of Mr. Justice Yates, as 
with that of Lord Mansfield, in the great case of Miller and Taylor.  But after all, property, in the 
social state, must be the creature of law; and it is a question of expediency, high and general, not 
particular expediency, how and how far the rights of authorship should be protected.  I confess, 
frankly, that I see, or think I see, objections to make it perpetual. 
Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act 1831, PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–
1900) (2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22us_1831%22. 
 34. See Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 983–84. 
 35. See BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 22. 
 36. See Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 20. 
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Crown to control the dissemination of ideas and expression, was particularly useful 
to the Crown during this period of religious conflict.  In pressing the Crown to 
renew its exclusive right to print, the Stationers’ Company regularly argued that 
censorship was essential to good government.37  The Company’s relationship with 
the Crown lasted until 1694, when Parliament refused to renew the Licensing Act 
of 1662.38 
With the expiration of the last Licensing Act, the explicit use of copyright as a 
form of censorship died out.  The Statute of Anne—passed in 1709 at the urging of 
the publishers who had lost their monopoly with the death of the Licensing Acts—
pointedly granted the exclusive right to publish to the author or the publisher, but 
not to the company as a whole.39  Monopolies had been outlawed in England by the 
Statute of Monopolies in 1624, but this statute exempted patents and copyrights.40  
The Statute of Anne was clearly designed to be antimonopolistic and not censorial, 
although whether it was successful is less clear.41 
2.  The Anti-Federalist Objection to the Copyright Clause and the Federalist 
Response 
During the ratification debates of the Constitution, a few anti-Federalists drew 
on copyright’s historical association with censorship to point to the proposed 
Copyright Clause as an example of how, despite Federalist protestations to the 
contrary, the Constitution allowed the new national government to control speech.42  
Even though the Statute of Anne severed the explicit connection between 
government censorship and copyright, copyright retained the potential to serve as a 
tool of censorship.43 
The Founders’ decision to give Congress the power to grant copyrights to 
authors only—unlike the Statute of Anne which allowed publishers to receive 
copyrights directly—minimized the danger that a group of publishers, like the 
Stationers’ Company, would emerge and act as a quasi governmental body that 
controlled public access to information.44  However, even though Congress was 
only given the power to grant copyrights to authors, the danger remained that it 
 
 37. Id. at 21. 
 38. See id. at 23. 
 39. See id. at 25. 
 40. Massachusetts passed a similar law prohibiting monopolies in 1641.  See BUGBEE, supra note 
23, at 61. 
 41. See Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 27–30. 
 42. Id. at 17. 
 43. Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 24 (“Acts of censorship 
protected the stationers’ copyright, but they neither created nor defined it.  Consequently, the demise of 
press control, in itself, did not deprive copyright of its efficacy as a devise of censorship.”). 
 44. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 986 (analyzing the First Amendment dangers of “enterprise 
monopolies,” entities that control large numbers of copyrights, thus exerting quasi-governmental control 
over the public’s access for information).  See also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:  
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 364–86 
(explaining the First Amendment dangers of concentrating copyrights in a small number of large 
holders). 
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might choose to favor certain authors with copyrights and deny copyrights to others 
whose speech it found seditious.  A similar argument was made during the 
Pennsylvania ratification debates: 
Tho it is not declared that Congress have a power to destroy the liberty of the press; 
yet, in effect they will have it.  For they will have the powers of self-preservation.  
They have a power to secure to authors the right of their writings.  Under this, they 
may license the press, no doubt; and under licensing the press, they may suppress it.45 
Although Congress’s speedy enactment of a general copyright statute reduced 
the risk that Congress would pick and choose between appropriate authors, the 
Federalist response to this argument during the ratification debate is relevant 
because it sheds light on how the ratifiers viewed the relationship between the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.46  James Wilson, a prominent 
Federalist and an active participant in the drafting of the Constitution, argued that 
nothing in Article I, section 8 granted Congress the power to regulate the press.47  
In addition to the argument that the regulation of speech simply was beyond 
Congress’s enumerated powers, Federalists pointed out that the Copyright Clause is 
the only power granted to Congress that includes a built-in purpose limitation.48  
Congress would only be able to use this power to promote the “Progress of Science 
and the useful Arts” and not to regulate the press.  In sum, the Federalists read the 
Copyright Clause as including an internal limit, which prevented Congress from 
using copyright to abridge the Freedom of Speech.  Thus, the ratification of the 
First Amendment did not add any limitations on Congress’s power to grant 
copyrights that were not already incorporated into the Copyright Clause itself.  By 
ratifying both the Constitution and the First Amendment, then, the People did not 
say that Copyright is immune from First Amendment scrutiny, but rather that the 
Copyright Clause must be interpreted as being consistent with First Amendment 
values. 
3.  The Shared Republican Values of the First Amendment and the Copyright 
Clause 
Although the built-in limitation on this enumerated power is generally ignored 
 
 45. Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 17 n.50 (quoting 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. XIV, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 454, 50 The First Copyright Act was enacted in 1790 by the 
Second Congress). 
 46. The first copyright act was enacted in 1790 by the Second Congress.  Copyright Act of 1790, 
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed). 
 47. Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 18.  On the importance of 
James Wilson, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 467 (2005). 
 48. See Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 13–14 n.40 (quoting 
Roger Sherman:  “First, the copyright clause is in fact ‘the promotion of Science’ clause:  the only 
provision of section eight of [the first Article of] the Constitution defining the purpose of, and therefore 
limiting, a power of Congress.  Second, the promotion of learning is inherently antithetical to 
censorship.”).  See also AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 47, at 112. 
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today, the limitation clearly mattered to the ratifiers.49  During the ratification 
debate, Federalists relied on a limitation internal to the clause to argue that it would 
not abridge freedom of speech.50  But the Copyright Clause was not seen as neutral 
with respect to free speech; rather, the phrase “progress of the science and arts” 
imbued the clause with the republican purpose of promoting the diffusion of 
learning through society.  The copyright regime, which mirrored the original role of 
juries in the constitutional scheme, was meant to help educate the public so they 
could exercise their civic duties well.51  During the passage of the first Copyright 
Act, George Washington explained: 
[T]he promotion of science and literature would help to secure a free constitution . . . 
by convincing those who are entrusted with public administration that every valuable 
end of government is best answered by the enlightened confidence of the public; and 
by teaching the people themselves to know and value their own rights; to discern and 
provide against invasions of them; to distinguish between oppression and the 
necessary exercise of lawful authority.52 
The title of the first copyright statute clearly advertises the types of works the 
ratifiers thought they would be encouraging—works useful to a young republic 
with a whole continent of unexplored land stretching before them:  “An Act for the 
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the 
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”53  
Similarly, in an address to Congress soon after the Constitution was ratified, 
George Washington explaind the enlightening purpose of the copyright act in this 
 
 49. See generally Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:  Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2005) (making 
a historical argument that the first part of the Intellectual Property Clause was intended to limit 
Congress’s power rather than being merely a nonbinding preamble).  For a failed attempt to give 
practical effect to the preamble of the Copyright Clause, see Lawrence Lessig’s argument before the 
Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
 50. See supra Part I.B. 
 51. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 93–94 (1998) (arguing that the primary purpose 
of juries is not primarily the efficient or accurate adjudication of disputes but rather a kind of civics 
lesson for the jurors). 
 52. See Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra note 1, at 357. 
 53. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed).  Professor Ginsburg claims 
that the following types of works were copyrighted under the early statute: 
For example, examination of the 5,368 publications (including newspapers and pamphlets) listed 
in the 1790–92 and 1798–99 volumes of Charles Evans’s American Bibliography indicates that 
republican publishing habits corresponded to the “new republican ideology [that] defin[ed] the 
virtuous citizen as one who was broadly informed about political doctrine and public affairs.”   
Evans’s records for these years show 540 newspapers (157 newspapers for 1790–92, 383 for 
1798–99), 441 titles in Political Science (207 for 1790–92, 234 for 1798–99), 302 titles in 
History (117 for 1790–92, 185 for 1798–99), 270 titles in Social Science (125 for 1790–92, 145 
for 1798–99), and 61 Fourth of July orations for 1798–99.  By contrast, the publication of novels 
appears fairly modest: 43 titles for 1790–92 and 119 for 1798–99.  This relative paucity of 
fiction also may reflect republican values.  Thomas Jefferson stated, “A great obstacle to good 
education is the inordinate passion prevalent for novels, and the time lost in that reading which 
should be instructively employed.” 
Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights, supra note 27, at 1002–03 (citations omitted). 
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way: 
Nor am I less persuaded that you will agree with me in opinion, that there is nothing 
which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of science and literature.  
Knowledge is in every country the basis of public happiness . . . .54 
Noah Webster’s A Grammatical Institute of the English Language exemplifies 
the uncontroversial works the Founders envisioned protecting by copyright.55  
Public educators, not artists, were intended to be the primary beneficiaries of 
copyright. 
These republican goals of copyright were consistent with First Amendment 
values.  The works the Founders intended to protect were uncontroversial and 
contributed to the steady progress of knowledge.  Moreover, the early First 
Amendment’s primarily structural concern with protecting popular majorities from 
aristocratic legislative majorities was not implicated by granting protection to such 
republican works.56  Copyright was seen as furnishing incentives to create the 
works that fed this public republican discourse on government and that generally 
contributed to knowledge.  As will be seen later in this Article, this characteristic of 
copyright at the founding supports the modern Supreme Court’s metaphor that 
copyright was intended to be the “engine of free speech.”57  Similarly, it is hard to 
see how a generation that believed knowledge was steadily progressing would view 
a copyright regime that incentivizes authors to contribute to that public body of 
knowledge as infringing the First Amendment.  Thus, to the extent that anyone at 
the time gave any thought to the intersection of copyright and free speech, the 
substance of the copyright and free speech regimes were seen as mutually 
reinforcing.58 
4.  The First Amendment’s Structural Bent 
The lack of any substantive free speech opposition to copyright at the founding 
is evident from the fact that the only constitutional criticism of giving Congress the 
power to grant copyrights concerned the danger that Congress would misuse this 
power and license the press.59  The concern for the misuse of power by legislative 
 
 54. BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 137. 
 55. NOAH WEBSTER, A GRAMMATICAL INSTITUTE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Isaiah Thomas 
& Ebenezer T. Andrews eds., 6th ed. 1800) (articulating and standardizing the grammar of  American 
English). 
 56. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 25–32.  The early republican ideal of copyright 
mirrors Professor Mieklejohn’s argument that a commitment to self-government entails an absolute 
prohibition on public discussion that touches on matters of governance.  See ALEXANDER MIEKLEJOHN, 
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 (1948).  See also Vincent Blasi, The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 551. 
 57. See infra Parts III & V for the full discussion, including why the modern understanding of 
copyright as an “engine of free speech” is different than at the founding. 
 58. For a recent argument using a different methodology that the Copyright Clause must be read 
to incorporate First Amendment Values, see Stephen J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of Copyright, 
2009 STAN. TECH. L.R. 2 (2009). 
 59. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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majorities, which Professor Blasi calls the “checking value” of the First 
Amendment, is separate from the question of what the contours of the copyright 
power should be—that is, how much expression copyright should protect.60  
Rather, the checking value is only concerned with the danger that elected 
representatives will abuse whatever power they are granted.61  At the state level, 
the ability of the legislature to grant copyrights was unquestioned.  The only issue 
at the national level was whether giving a strong new federal government the power 
to grant nationwide copyrights would tempt that government to directly regulate 
speech.62 
C.  WHY THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT DID NOT 
CONFLICT WHEN THEY WERE RATIFIED 
In sum, the ambivalence of the Founders with regard to the theoretical 
justification for copyright, the internal limitations of the Copyright clause, its 
republican aspirations and the structural orientation of the First Amendment all 
explain why the theories underlying the Copyright Clause and First Amendment 
were not seen to be in conflict at the time of the founding.  Furthermore, as a 
practical matter, copyright was not a top priority for the ratifiers of the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights.  Larger political issues like the number of representatives in 
each house of Congress, how slaves would be counted electorally and the powers 
of the Executive and Congress dominated the ratification debates.63  Furthermore, 
the less expansive nature of copyright regime made it even less conspicuous than it 
is today.64 
 
 60. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, supra note 56, at 528. 
 61. Id. at 528–36.  For an argument that at the founding the antebellum bill of rights was 
concerned primarily with structural issues, such as the danger a regime would permit public officials to 
abuse their power, rather than “rights” in the libertarian sense of the term, see also AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 3–133 (1998). 
 62. See supra note 31 for a brief survey of the state copyright statutes.  See David Yassky, Eras of 
the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1703–13 (1991), for an argument that at the Founding 
the dangers of State regulation of speech were considered much less severe than those of the federal 
government regulating speech.  See also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that 
the First Amendment does not apply against the individual States). 
 63. Oren Bracha, Commentary on the Intellectual Property Constitutional Clause 1789, PRIMARY 
SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/ 
exec/ausgabeCom/%22us_1789%22. 
 64. At the time of the Founding, copyright protected much less than the modern copyright system 
does.  Only unauthorized verbatim reproductions of copyrighted works, or verbatim reproductions with 
only slight variations meant to evade the copyright statute, were considered infringing.  See infra Part 
II.B.  As copyright expanded to cover more expression and technological developments made 
infringement easier, copyright effectively silenced more and more people.  Even today, Congress does 
not think deeply about copyright policy.  Congress outsources the drafting of copyright legislation to the 
industries that legislation governs.  See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative 
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870–79 (1987) (examining the interindustry negotiations involved in 
the drafting of the Copyright Act of 1976).  See also L. Ray Patterson, Comment, Eldred v. Reno, An 
Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 230 (2001) (“The custom 
of allowing the copyright industry to write copyright legislation apparently dates back to 1905 when 
Thorvald Solberg, the Register of Copyright, wanted a new copyright statute and realized that he would 
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The Copyright Clause was certainly not viewed as a substantive innovation, but 
rather as a solution to the collective action problem that had plagued State efforts to 
grant meaningful copyright protection.  During the month before the Constitutional 
Convention, James Madison captured both the relative lack of interest in the 
question of intellectual property as well as the practical reason why the drafters 
found it necessary to include the Copyright Clause in the Constitution at all: 
“[W]ant of concert in matters where common interest requires it . . . . Instances of 
inferior moment are the want of uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization 
and literary property”.65  The plight of Noah Webster, who spent years traveling up 
and down the continent trying to secure copyrights to his monumental A 
Grammatical Institute of the English Language, was well known to the Founders, 
many of whom were members of the assemblies that he petitioned.66  Some States 
tried to solve the obvious problem of piracy of their works in neighboring States by 
passing copyright laws which would only take effect when every other State passed 
similar laws.67  However, since Delaware failed to pass a copyright statute, the 
statutes with this provision never went into effect.68  This failure was clear 
evidence, to anyone who still needed convincing, that a national remedy was 
necessary.69  The uneventful and unopposed insertion of the clause in the 
Constitution speaks to the general agreement that a national remedy to the problem 
was required.70 
II.  TRANSFORMATIONS 
To the extent that the troubled history of copyright and censorship made the 
Founders uneasy about the coexistence of the Copyright Clause with the First 
Amendment, this uneasiness was tempered by the fact that the two clauses were 
seen to participate in the same republican project.  As further protection against the 
free speech dangers of copyright, the founding era notions of what constituted free 
speech were incorporated into the preamble of the Copyright Clause.71  However, 
as the republican project embodied in the Constitution was tested by the conflict 
over slavery during the Nineteenth Century, both the copyright regime and the First 
Amendment underwent profound transformations that upset this easy coexistence 
and gave rise to unavoidable tensions between the two clauses. 
A.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In the past century, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects 
 
have to have the cooperation of the industry to get it.”). 
 65. BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 125. 
 66. See id. at 106–08. 
 67. Id. at 109–24. 
 68. Id. at 123–24. 
 69. Id. at 124. 
 70. Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution:  Why Did the Framers 
Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 376 (1992). 
 71. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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the right to think and express ideas that may be considered dangerous by the 
majority of citizens.72  Twentieth Century Justices have explained that the First 
Amendment embodies a political philosophy that considers vigorous, even 
dangerous, dissent as essential to the health of the body politic.73  However, it is not 
clear that the ratifiers believed that a free speech right protecting views considered 
dangerous by a large majority was as essential to the health of a democracy as we 
do today.74  While the First Amendment embodied a commitment to enlightened 
tolerance of dissenting speech at the Federal level, it also reflected a strong 
commitment to the doctrine of states’ rights in that it did not restrict the ability of 
state governments to abridge the freedom of speech.75  Furthermore, the core of 
speech protected by the amendment was not dissenting speech that the majority 
considered dangerous to society.  Rather, the history of the free speech struggles 
leading up to the ratification of the Consitution convinced the ratifiers that the 
speech of the majority of the People needed protection from suppression by the 
majority of the legislature.76  The modern understanding of the First Amendment 
was developed by the American people themselves, beginning with the popular 
rejection of the Alien and Sedition laws and culminating in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s transformation and incorporation of the First Amendment.77  The 
absolutist understanding of free speech as a natural right of all citizens, including 
those whose views are violently opposed to those of the majority, was in large part 
the product of the abolitionist movement and the history of the suppression of 
antislavery speech in the Antebellum South.  As the Civil War approached, people 
began to argue that the First Amendment recognized an absolute and natural right 
 
 72. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding a state criminal syndicalism 
statute, under which Ku Klux Klan members were prosecuted for speech abstractly advocating violence, 
unconstitutional because it covered speech that was not directed at inciting “imminent lawless action”). 
 73. One of the most quotable expressions of this understanding of the First Amendment was 
penned by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free 
to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over 
the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the 
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that freedom to think 
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine 
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of American government. 
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 74. Compare Yassky, supra note 62, at 1703–17 (relying in part on the work of historian Leonard 
Levy to argue that the failure to apply the First Amendment to the states created a “legacy of 
suppression” of speech at the state level in the antebellum United States), with Vincent Blasi, The 
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 461 n.26 (1985) (“In 
recent years, discussion of the original understanding of the first amendment has been dominated by 
Leonard Levy’s provocative, elaborately documented, and in my opinion, seriously flawed thesis that 
the framers of the Bill of Rights had a narrow and essentially non-libertarian view of the freedoms of 
speech and the press.”). 
 75. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
 76. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 20–26. 
 77. See id. at 22–23. 
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to speak for all citizens, including those whose views were violently opposed to 
those of the majority.  The decision by the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to incorporate the First Amendment against the states reflected this new 
understanding of what speech the First Amendment was designed to protect.  In 
other words, the abolitionist struggle for a broader reading of the First Amendment 
not only drove the expansion of the Amendment’s application (to the states) but 
also drove the expansion of the scope of the right of free speech.78 
Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court read the 
First Amendment to apply only to the federal government.79  Despite James 
Madison’s contrary intuition, state regulation of speech was viewed as less 
dangerous than federal regulation of speech.80  The states were seen to be closer to 
the people whose speech they were regulating, and thus were more likely to be held 
accountable for any antispeech measures they passed.81  In opposition to this 
reading of the First Amendment, abolitionists took the stance that a representative 
democracy requires a core area of speech that is absolutely free from all 
government suppression and also free from some private suppression.82  The post 
Civil War Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment with this recent struggle for 
a new libertarian conception of free speech in mind.83  Thus, in incorporating the 
First Amendment against the states, the Fourteenth Amendment also ratified this 
new reading of the First Amendment.84  Surveying the abolitionists’ struggle 
against the Southern sedition laws and proslavery mobs will help understand the 
contours of the postincorporation First Amendment.  It will show how the 
postincorporation First Amendment poses new problems for an expansive 
copyright regime. 
During the lead up to the Civil War, from the 1830s onward, the South became 
more and more committed to a concept of free speech that was severely curtailed in 
order to protect the majority of the community from what was perceived as the 
threat posed by minority speakers.85  The threat was that abolitionist ideas would 
spark an uprising by the slaves, confirming the slaveowner’s greatest fear.  This 
fear was exacerbated by the radical abolitionists’ increasingly strident 
 
 78. For an argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights against 
the states changed the meaning of those rights, see AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 215–
31.  For a brief discussion of the role of abolitionist speech in the transformation of the First 
Amendment, see id. at 241–42. 
 79. See Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250. 
 80. See Yassky, supra note 62, at 1708. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 77–80. 
 83. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 145–62, 186 (arguing that most of the 
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed with the arguments of abolitionists and others that argued 
that Barron was wrongly decided, that the Bill of Rights applied against the states, and that the rights in 
the Bill of Rights were more robust than had been held by courts). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoypra, supra note 5, at 1117–18.  See also 
RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM:  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 28–33 
(1963) (examining the slaveholders’ almost paranoid fear of antislavery speech). 
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denunciations of the South’s “peculiar institution.”86  As an indication of the extent 
of this paranoia, consider the radical aboutface in the thinking Dr. Thomas Cooper, 
the president of South Carolina College and a prominent Southern intellectual.  
After the Nat Turner rebellion of 1831, Cooper wrote that he did not believe 
abolitionist publications should be tolerated.87  However, in 1829, only a few years 
before, he had published The Right of Free Discussion, which opens with the 
following language: 
I intend, therefor, upon the present occasion, to maintain the RIGHT OF FREE 
DISCUSSION, in its fullest extent; as applied to any and every question, opinion, 
tenant, or doctrine, political, theological, moral, metaphysical, or philosophical, within 
the widest range of human inquiry. . . .88 
Dr. Cooper had been a leading defender of an enlightenment conception of 
freedom of thought in the lower South.89  The speed at which his thought changed 
is indicative of the unwillingness of the rest of the South to tolerate antislavery 
speech. 
Printers of abolitionist material were prosecuted under sedition laws passed by 
the Southern states.90  The destruction of abolitionist presses by proslavery mobs 
received the blessing of the community.91  Ministers were prosecuted for preaching 
that slavery violated the Gospel and for distributing antislavery books.92  A 
university professor was driven out of the State merely for speaking favorably 
 
 86. NYE, supra note 85. 
 87. CLEMENT EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 26 (1940). 
 88. Thomas Cooper, The Right of Free Discussion, in 3 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
COOPER 4 (Udo Thiel ed., 2001). 
 89. See EATON supra note 87, at 25. 
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into the state or circulating any publication for the purpose of exciting a revolt among the slaves was 
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committed to the slavery cause, passed strong sedition laws.  EATON, supra note 87, at 122–24, 127.  
Although the full draconian force of these laws was usually tempered in application by the courts, the 
laws remained on the books and had an undoubted chilling effect of antislavery speech in the antebellum 
South.  Id. at 131. 
 91. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1125. 
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about the Republican candidate for President.93  In all these cases, minority speech 
was labeled “incendiary,” and censored because it was viewed as causing “bad 
tendencies” in everyone who heard it, regardless of whether they were slaves, 
freedmen or poor non slaveholding whites.94 
During this time, abolitionist lawyers and their adversaries were in the midst of a 
debate concerning whether the First Amendment was solely a check on the power 
of the national government or whether it was a preexisting natural right that should 
therefore apply against both state and federal government.95  A pivotal moment in 
this debate was the murder of the Reverend Elijah P. Lovejoy.96  Before this event, 
Abolitionists were the primary advocates for the stance that a representative 
democracy requires a core area of speech that was absolutely free from 
suppression.97  Indeed, a number of Northerners were not adverse to the passage of 
antiabolitionist speech laws in their States.98  Most of them disapproved of 
abolitionist ideas and abolitionist speech, viewing them as fanatical and 
dangerous.99  The prevailing opinion was that slavery was an evil, but it was an evil 
for which the South was not morally responsible since slavery had been created by 
the British.100 
The Reverend Lovejoy published a paper that took antislavery positions from 
time to time.101  Driven out of Missouri, he set up a press in Alton, Illinois.102  He 
was murdered by a mob that came to destroy his press.103  His death was the most 
dramatic of a series of events in which mobs in the States bordering the South 
destroyed abolitionist presses.104  At first many viewed the destruction of the 
abolitionist presses by mobs as being simply what abolitionists deserved for 
 
 93. Id. at 1136. 
 94. See the opinion of Georgia governor Wilson Lumpkin in his message to the legislature in 
1835 (“Should, however the abolitionists be permitted to proceed without molestation or only have to 
encounter the weapons of reason and argument, have we not reason to fear, that their untiring efforts 
may succeed in misleading the majority of a people who have no direct interest in the great question at 
issue, and finally produce interference with the constitutional rights of the slaveholders.”), quoted in 
EATON, supra note 87, at 128. 
 95. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 145–62. 
 96. Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1111, 1145–47. 
 97. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 160–62. 
 98. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1222. 
 99. See id. at 1120–21. 
 100. See id. at 1118.  See also the argument of future Chief Justice Taney while defending the right 
of a Maryland citizen to criticize slavery in court in 1819 (“A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to 
endure the evil of slavery for a time.  It was imposed upon us by another nation, while we were yet in a 
state of colonial vassalage.  It cannot be easily, or suddenly removed.  Yet while it continues it is a blot 
on our national character, and every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be effectually, 
though it must be gradually, wiped away . . . ”), quoted in EATON, supra note 87, at 132. 
 101. Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1132–35. 
 102. Id. at 1135–37. 
 103. Id. at 1142. 
 104. Mob violence was a common symptom of the fear of slave revolt that gripped the South in the 
1830s. See EATON, supra note 87, at 97 (describing a breakout of mob violence in Mississippi in 1835).  
See also Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5 (describing the story of another 
publisher that was pursued by mobs). 
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speaking out against slavery.105  However, after the Reverend Lovejoy’s death, 
many in the Northern mainstream began to take the position that the private 
suppression of speech they did not like posed a threat to speech they did like.106  A 
growing number of people began to think that even though abolitionist ideas may 
not be popular, they needed to be protected or else other speech would be in 
danger.107  The soaring natural rights and religious rhetoric used by abolitionists 
provided the conceptual framework to articulate these new worries.108  The 
northern press, an important element of this influential northern opinion, also began 
to view the destruction of abolitionist presses by mobs as a threat to free speech.109  
The same mainstream presses that had supported the mobs and had refused to print 
discussions of the slavery issue began to see the suppression of abolitionist speech 
as an issue that concerned them, though they continued to roundly denounce 
abolitionists.110 
To be clear, Northern opinion saw the destruction of presses by mobs as not 
merely a problem to be dealt with by criminal or tort law—though it clearly was, as 
well—but also as a violation of the constitutional right to speak.111  The idea is that 
the First Amendment has a positive component—that is, the freedom to speak—as 
well as the traditional negative component of freedom from governmental 
suppression.112  To be sure, this reading of the First Amendment must contend with 
the language of that Amendment.  The Amendment reads:  “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”113  On its face, 
this language does not seem to grant an absolute right to speak to every person; it 
only prohibits the government from passing a law abridging the freedom of speech.  
The abolitionist argument, then, was that the First Amendment recognized this 
natural right to speak without being coercively silenced by other people when it 
referred to the “freedom of speech.”114 
The members of the Republican Party who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the ratifiers of that Amendment, forged their understanding of what “freedom 
of speech” meant during the struggle over the suppression of abolitionist speech.115  
These men viewed Southern sedition laws as falling well within the core of the 
 
 105. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1121–22. 
 106. Id. at 1145. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., this quote from a newspaper of the time:  “Freedom of opinion and of the press is an 
inalienable privilege secured to us by our political magna carta as well as by the original inherent right 
of our nature . . . .”, quoted in Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1147.  See 
also NYE, supra note 85, for a discussion about William Ellery Channing, a famous Unitarian minister 
and a moderate antislavery spokesman. 
 109. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1121, 1146–47. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 1147. 
 112. See id. at 1180. 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 114. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 134–56, for an argument that this reading 
of the First Amendment was supported by the “declaratory theory” of rights, according to which the Bill 
of Rights were seen as “declaratory of certain fundamental common-law rights.” 
 115. Id. at 186. 
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evils that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent.116  During the lead 
up to the Civil War, the Republican party frequently denounced the antirepublican 
character of the South, of which the governmental and private suppression of 
speech was seen as one of the chief evils.117  Thus, when the States ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not only did they incorporate the First Amendment against 
the States, they also replaced the federalist conception of the First Amendment with 
the conception of “freedom of speech” developed in the abolitionist struggle 
against southern sedition laws and southern mobs. 
To summarize, there are at least three important aspects of this transformation of 
the concept of free speech.  First, free speech was seen as protecting the speaker not 
only from government control but also from certain types of private attempts to 
control speech.118  Northerners came to see mob suppression of antislavery speech 
as dangerous to public discourse.  Second, even minority speech that was 
considered dangerous by a large section of the population came to be seen as 
requiring protection.  Free speech advocates frequently argued that today’s 
minority speech is tomorrow’s majority speech and that the best minds of their 
generation were often rejected by their contemporaries before their greatness was 
recognized.119  Third, this free speech space was protected from both state and 
federal suppression. 
B.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE COPYRIGHT REGIME 
The copyright regime also underwent profound changes during this period.  
Copyright has expanded continuously from its early beginnings in the 1790 
Copyright Act, covering more works and extending the period of protection from 
the initial fourteen plus fourteen years to the current life plus seventy years.120  The 
second half of the Nineteenth Century was a time of momentous change, not only 
in the length of copyright protection, but also in the nature of the works protected 
and in the character of the creators’ exclusive rights.  As Professor Oren Bracha 
expresses it, while a present day copyright lawyer would have a difficult time 
practicing at the turn of the Nineteenth Century, he would be relatively at home at 
the turn of the Twentieth.121  During the Nineteenth Century, there was a shift 
 
 116. Id. at 161–62.  See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:  THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 100–02 (1970) (analyzing the political consciousness of 
the party that drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 117. See FONER, supra note 116. 
 118. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy supra note 5, at 1180. 
 119. Galileo was a popular example.  Id. at 1144. 
 120. Compare Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed) (establishing a term of 
fourteen years and fourteen year renewal), with Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 
1075 (superseded 1976) (establishing a term of twenty-eight years with twenty-eight year renewal), 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (establishing a term of life of 
the author plus fifty years), and Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 
102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 302) (establishing a term of life of the author plus 
seventy years and the earlier of one hundred and twenty-five years after creation or ninety-five years 
after publication for corporate works). 
 121. See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 399. 
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toward a natural rights justification for copyright as the utilitarian justification fell 
out of favor.  This shift had important consequences for the amount of control 
authors were given over their expressive works. 
The most significant change was the move from the relatively clear traditional 
notion of protecting the verbatim “copy” to the more amorphous concept of 
protecting the “work.”  As this conceptual shift took place, the economics of the 
entertainment industry were also changing, prompting members of the industry to 
lobby Congress for more intellectual property protection.122  At the end of the 
Eighteenth Century, copyright was primarily a regulation of the book trade.123  This 
regime tolerated a great deal of the copying and adapting that would be seen as 
illegal and unjust today.  Most notably, abridgements and translations of another’s 
work were viewed as not only noninfringing, but as useful activities that gave a 
larger section of the public access to the work in question.124  By the middle of the 
Nineteenth Century, however, popular sentiment, and eventually black letter law 
moved in favor of granting authors broader rights to exploit the entire economic 
value of their work, through translations, abridgements, adaptations, dramatizations 
and other derivative works.125 
The case of Stowe v. Thomas demonstrates the shift toward a stronger natural 
rights theory.126  The 1853 case pitted Harriet Beecher Stowe, who had authorized 
a German translation of her bestselling Uncle Tom’s Cabin for the German 
speaking market in Pennsylvania, against the defendant who beat her to the same 
market with his own translation that was published in Die Free Press.127  The issue 
was whether the author of a copyrighted work had the exclusive right to translate 
that work.128  Justice Grier held that an author only has the exclusive right to 
 
 122. Id. at 375 (“The pattern of expansion through the statutory amendments might mislead.  One 
may conclude from it that the growth of copyrightable subject matter was merely a function of new 
emerging technologies and the consolidation of political influence and power in the hands of relevant 
emerging interest groups.  There is no doubt, that such factors played a crucial role in the process.  Yet 
at this point I want to illuminate the connections between the expanding subject matter of copyright and 
other conceptual developments more internal to legal discourse.”). 
 123. Id. at 289.  See also Steal This Footage, Interview with Eben Moglen—From the Birth of 
Printing to Industrial Culture; the Root of Copyright, STEAL THIS FILM 2 (April 2007), 
http://footage.stealthisfilm.com/video/10 (discussing the history of copyright). 
 124. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED LOOK AT COPYRIGHT 17 (1967) (“[T]he 
infringement problem was being answered, seventy-five years after [the Statute of Anne], by looking not 
so much to what the defendant had taken as to what he had added or contributed.”); Gyles v. Wilcox, 
(1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490 (Gr. Brit.) (“[T]his must not be carried so far as to restrain persons 
from making a real and fair abridgment, for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, 
because not only the paper and print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shown in 
them, and in many cases are extremely useful, though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and 
curtailing the sense of the author.”).  See also Newbery’s Case (1773) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch.) (Gr. Brit.). 
 125. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (right to public performance of dramatic 
works); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (copyright for photographs); Copyright Act of 1870, 
ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (right to translate and right to extended dramatization); Act of Jan. 6, 1987, 
ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481 (right to perform musical compositions). 
 126. 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853). 
 127. Id. at 201 
 128. Id. 
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reproduce the concrete expression of the ideas and conception that make up her 
work, but has no right to those ideas and conceptions themselves.129  Since clothing 
the same ideas in another language could not be called a “copy” of the original 
expression, the author had no exclusive right to translate her work.130  Justice Grier 
goes so far as to say: 
By the publication of Mrs. Stowe’s book, the creations of the genius and imagination 
of the author have become as much public property as those of Homer or Cervantes.  
Uncle Tom and Topsy are as much publici juris as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.  
All her conceptions and inventions may be used and abused by imitators, play-rights 
and poetasters.  They are no longer her own—those who have purchased her book, 
may clothe them in English doggerel, in German or Chinese prose.  Her absolute 
dominion and property in the creations of her genius and imagination have been 
voluntarily relinquished.131 
Thus, Stowe v. Thomas is an eloquent articulation of the traditional copyright 
regime principles applied to a more modern economic situation—a bestselling 
author who wants to exploit new markets for her work. 
The decision was widely criticized in the years that followed.132  Congress 
pointedly overturned it with the 1870 ammendment to the copyright statute.133  By 
1868, a Court held in Daly v. Palmer that a play that borrowed the idea of rescuing 
a woman tied to traintracks just in time, while having a significantly different plot, 
infringed the play, Under the Gaslight, that originated that scene.134  Daly 
illustrates the new copyright paradigm in holding that a theatrical idea from one 
play cannot be recast in a different play without the permission of the creator of the 
original.135  The movement from conceptualizing infringement as verbatim copying 
to conceptualizing infringement as adapting a preexisting idea to a new work and a 
new market is the movement from protecting the authors’ “copy” to protecting their 
“work.”136  Daly is an extreme example.  After Baker v. Seldon, in 1879, 
established the doctrine that ideas are not copyrightable, it is unlikely that Daly 
would have been decided the same way.137  Nevertheless, Daly illustrates the trend 
 
 129. Id. at 207. 
 130. Id. (“A ‘copy’ of a book must, therefore, be a transcript of the language in which the 
conceptions of the author are clothed; . . . The same conceptions clothed in another language cannot 
constitute the same composition, nor can it be called a transcript or ‘copy’ of the same ‘book.’  I have 
seen a literal translation of Burns’ poems into French prose; but to call it a copy of the original, would 
be as ridiculous as the translation itself.”). 
 131. Id. at 208 (internal quotation omitted). 
 132. Eaton Drone took the time in his leading 1879 treatise to demolish the reasoning of Stowe.  
EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 449–55 (1879).  See also Oren Bracha, Commentary on Stowe v. 
Thomas, USA (1853), PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (2008), http://www. 
copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22us_1853b%22. 
 133. Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 320, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). 
 134. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1139 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868). 
 135. See id. at 1132. 
 136. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 303. 
 137. See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
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of expanding the scope of copyright protection.138 
The “work” is the creation of an author abstracted from any particular 
medium.139  Integral to this new concept is the idea that the creator should be able 
to have a general right to control his creation.140
 
 As a practical matter, this 
development caused the bundle of rights the author held to expand significantly.  In 
theory, the creator would be entitled to the entire market value of the work, 
including any value that could be earned from adaptation of the work to different 
markets.141
 
 Derivative rights are precisely the right to exploit all potential markets 
for a work.142
 
 This type of a late Nineteenth Century right stands in stark contrast 
to copyright law as it existed at that turn of the Nineteenth Century.  The move to 
protect the “work” raises more questions in copyright doctrine than it answers, 
since the right of the author cannot conceivably extend to every future creation that 
only remotely touches his original work.143  What is nonetheless clear is that this 
shift places copyright law on a collision course with the postincorporation First 
Amendment. 
III.  THE “MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS”:  AN ATTEMPT TO 
HARMONIZE THE CLAUSES 
By the second half of the Nineteenth Century, the values animating the 
copyright and free speech regimes had undergone a transformation.  To a large 
extent, however, these regimes still coexisted peacefully.  The deep reason for this 
peaceful coexistence is latent in the Republican campaign slogan of the 1850s that 
placed “Free Labor” and “Free Speech” side by side:  “Free Speech, Free Press, 
Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory, Fremont.”144  By creating a market for 
 
 138. The fact that the Court felt it necessary in 1879 to create the idea/expression doctrine is 
illustrative of copyright’s movement from protecting authors from only verbatim copying to protecting 
them from use of the concrete ideas embodied in their work. 
 139. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 354.  See also Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, 
and Fair Use, supra note 1, at 11. 
 140. Id. at 354. 
 141. Id. at 303, 319, 322. 
 142. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 5.  See also Jane Ginsburg, Creation and 
Commercial Value:  Copyright Protection for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1886 
(1990) (arguing that a “personality justification,” which would protect works that could be seen as an 
extension of the author’s unique personality, supported the rise of derivative rights); Paul Goldstein, 
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209 (1982) (examining 
different justifications for derivative rights). 
 143. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (1841) (providing an early description of copyright as 
metaphysical); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 217 (observing that it is when the law starts 
protecting “works” not “copies” that copyright becomes “metaphysical”).  Compare Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 
125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that decorative ceramic tiles created by a company that mounted 
an artist’s copyrighted works into tiles were not “derivative works” and rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach), with Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that a tile-preparing process that was similar to the process in Lee v. A.R.T. Co. results in derivative 
works), and Alfred Bell Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (providing an 
approach that differs from both Lee and Mirage). 
 144. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 235. 
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speech—especially dissenting and controversial speech—the Copyright Clause 
actually served the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court adopted a version of this 
argument in Harpers & Row v. Nation Enterprises.145 
Authors, including authors of fiction, were instrumental in sparking public 
debate over the most important questions leading up to the Civil War.  Abraham 
Lincoln called Harriet Beecher Stowe “the little woman who wrote the book that 
made this great war.”146  Frederick Douglass was another popular abolitionist writer 
whose work forced people to confront slavery, an issue that they would have rather 
avoided.147  Hinton Helper’s The Impending Crisis of The South:  How to Meet It, 
which urged nonslaveholding whites to revolt against the economic system of 
slavery, was a prime example of an incendiary work.148  It was controversial and 
widely read.149  Although their works were often popular, many of the views of 
these authors obviously fell outside the mainstream of southern society.  Thus, 
there is a strong argument that a Copyright Clause that allowed all authors a strong 
property right in their creations regardless of the content of those creations, such 
that no one could interfere with their markets, made good First Amendment sense. 
A content neutral copyright would protect the property rights of all authors 
regardless of whether the majority of society agreed with their opinions.150
 
 A form 
of this argument is made by Professor Neil Netanel when he argues that the 
historical alternative to a copyright system is a patronage system of some form, and 
the Founders were anxious to avoid a patronage system.151  Presumably, under a 
patronage system artistic challenges to the established order would be less likely to 
occur, as authors would be unlikely to criticize the people who paid them.152  While 
 
 145. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[I]t should not 
be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.  By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive 
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appearing national market.  As such it attracted many adaptations and translations.  Thus Stowe’s stakes 
in expanding the scope of copyright protection as to encompass such ubiquitous and potentially valuable 
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 147. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1118 (“[T]he preferred way of 
dealing with the problem [of slavery] was not to deal with it and to wait.”). 
 148. HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH:  HOW TO MEET IT (1857) 
 149. See Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper’s Book, supra note 92, at 1148–49 (“In 
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 150. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (making the related 
and familiar argument that copyright must not make decisions concerning what to protect based on the 
aesthetic opinions of judges). 
 151. See Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra note 1, at 357–58. 
 152. See id. at 353 (“Prior to the first modern copyright statutes in the eighteenth century, writers 
and artists were heavily dependent on royal, feudal, and church patronage for their livelihoods.  This 
dependency undermined expressive autonomy and thwarted the development of a vital, freethinking 
intelligentsia.”).  See also BOYLE, supra note 14, at 22 (quoting Thomas Babington Macaulay:  authors 
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the argument that a strong copyright regime supports democratic deliberation is 
consonant with ideas circulating in the founding era, it becomes particularly 
relevant to the question of the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment after the abolitionist struggle discussed above changed the focus of the 
First Amendment to the protection of dissenting speech.153  After the Civil War, it 
became relevant to the First Amendment to argue that a full blooded property right 
for authors would encourage the type of constructive and creative dissent that 
ultimately brought the downfall of the South’s “peculiar institution.” 
The author’s right to the market value of and general control over her work was 
grounded in a theory of natural justice where the author’s labor produced value that 
could only justly be realized by the author.154  Securing for authors the right to the 
full value of their works fit well into the free labor ideology of the time, which was 
an essential part of the ascendant Republican Party at the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.155 
 
remunerated.  One of those ways is patronage; the other is copyright . . . I can conceive no system more 
fatal to the integrity and independence of literary men than one under which they should be taught to 
look for their daily bread to the favour of ministers and nobles.”). 
 153. For a founding era version of the argument that copyright supports democratic innovation 
argument see BUGBEE, supra note 23, at 111–12 (noting that the tireless founding era copyright 
promoter, Noah Webster, did not focus his arguments against a patronage system on the ground that a 
copyright system would promote dissent or public deliberation.  Rather, he wrote to Elias Boudinot, 
President of the Confederate Congress at the time, urging that “[a] literary reputation is necessary in 
order to complete [the United States’] national character . . . . As we have few Gentlemen of fortune 
sufficient to enable them to spend a whole life in study, or induce others to do it by their patronage, it is 
more necessary, in this country than in any other, that the rights of authors should be secured by law.”). 
 154. See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 371 (“They abstracted the concept of property 
and reconstructed it as the natural right for the protection of any kind of market value.”).  Although the 
most well-known expression of this idea is found in Justice Holmes’s opinion in Herbert v. Shanley Co., 
242 U.S. 591, 594–95 (1917), the origins of the idea lie in the Nineteenth Century.  Shanley presented 
the question whether a composer of a work is entitled to compensation for performance of the work 
when the work is performed in a restaurant, but no fee is charged specifically for the music.  Justice 
Holmes articulates the right of the author to all value created by his work in this way: 
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money is taken at the 
door, they are very imperfectly protected.  Performances not different in kind from those of the 
defendants could be given that might compete with and even destroy the success of the 
monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say that there is no need to 
construe the statute so narrowly. The defendants’ performances are not eleemosynary.  They are 
part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to a 
particular item which those present are expected to order is not important.  It is true that the 
music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper 
elsewhere.  The object is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of 
conversation, or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a 
silent meal.  If music did not pay, it would be given up.  If it pays, it pays out of the public’s 
pocket.  Whether it pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is enough. 
Id. 
 155. See generally FONER, supra note 116.  Treatise writers of the era made great use of the 
Lockean idea that an author is justly entitled to a property right in his or her work because of the labor 
expended in its production.  See supra note 132 discussing Drone’s argument that Stowe v. Thomas was 
wrongly decided.  Even though in 1834 the Supreme Court denied the existence of a perpetual common 
law copyright after publication in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (Pet. 8) 591 (1834), the force of the natural 
rights argument for authors’ entitlement to the entire market value of their work survived.  See Bracha, 
Owning Ideas, supra note 32, at 369: 
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The language of the Constitution also supports the use of strong property rights 
and markets to achieve the speech related goals of the Copyright Clause.  The 
clause empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”156  The text of the clause shows that the 
framers and ratifiers contemplated creating a market for the works of authors by 
granting them economic rights in their creations.157 
In sum, it is possible to draw together the natural rights thread with the 
Republican thread to make a compelling argument that the post Civil War 
copyright and First Amendment regimes did not conflict.  These ideas share the 
common theme that the market mediates any conflict between the Copyright Clause 
and the First Amendment.  The marketplace of ideas, conceived as an engine of 
free speech and created with content neutral property rights granted by the 
government, is the common ground of the First Amendment and copyright.  On the 
one hand, the rise of minority authors producing controversial bestsellers 
strengthened the natural rights argument that these risk takers should receive the 
full economic value of their works.  On the other hand, the Republican ideology of 
free labor and its implicit capitalist organization of the economy were favorable to 
the creation of the metaphor of the “marketplace of ideas.”  If the realm of culture 
and ideas was a marketplace, then how could the federal grant of property rights to 
authors, the basis for this market, be a violation of the First Amendment? 
IV.  LIMITS TO THE “ENGINE OF THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS” 
METAPHOR 
Although the argument that copyright is an “engine of the marketplace of ideas” 
resolves many of its tensions with the First Amendment, it does not completely 
 
Nonetheless the dominant notion of copyright as protection of market value remained entangled 
with a conception of property as a pre-political naturally defined right.  The rule that denied post 
publication common law copyright did not undermine such an understanding, but rather 
supported it.  Its received form came to be that the statute preempted and took away common 
law protection from the moment of publication onwards.  The historical inaccuracy 
notwithstanding, this further entrenched the idea that the origin of copyright was in a common 
law right, which in turn reflected a natural property right . . . the statute itself was often 
interpreted in light of the supposed prior common law right. 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
 157. David Ladd pushes this textual argument further.  He argues, in exactly the same vein as 
Nineteenth Century treatise writers Curtis and Drone, that the author is entitled to the entire economic 
value of a work because copyright is a property right.  David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in 
Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 421, 422 (1983).  Marshalling support for the argument, Ladd notes 
that the Copyright Clause includes the only use of the word “right” in the original Constitution.  Id. at 
422.  While the use of the word “right” might not be enough by itself to support a perpetual common 
law copyright that peacefully coexists with the statutory copyright, as Wheaton v. Peters finds, in the 
post Fourteenth Amendment world, it does strengthen the case for a natural rights reading of the 
Copyright Clause in the same way that the rights language of the Bill of Rights supports a stronger 
reading of those Amendments than they received in the antebellum era.  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 
(1834); AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 146–56 (discussing the “declaratory” reading of 
the Bill of Rights in the antebellum era). 
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account for the transformation the First Amendment underwent during the Civil 
War.  The history of mob suppression of antislavery speech and the incorporation 
of the First Amendment against the States shows that private suppression of speech 
can violate the First Amendment.  Recall the role antislavery mobs played in the 
free speech debate leading up to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
murder of the Reverend Lovejoy was an important turning point in the 
development of a more libertarian attitude toward free speech.158  Mob destruction 
of abolitionist presses sparked the idea that free speech has a positive component 
that can be infringed in addition to its traditional negative component—protection 
against government regulation of speech.159  The mobs were viewed as dangerous 
because they functioned as censors, inhibiting public discussion of the issue of 
slavery, the burning issue of the day, and preventing individual citizens from 
expressing their opinions.160
 
The power to enjoin the use of an author’s work, especially when the right 
infringed is one of the more expansive post Civil War rights (like the right to 
prepare derivative works), is analogous to the power of the antebellum mob to shut 
down the antislavery press.  When authors who create works that become important 
parts of culture are given control over all potential markets for those works, such 
that they have the power to enjoin someone from writing a sequel or another work 
based off of their original work, they enjoin private parties from speaking, and they 
also enjoin the public at large from hearing dissenting versions of those cultural 
works.161
  
For example, in Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., a district court 
enjoined an author from publishing a retelling of Gone with the Wind called The 
Wind Done Gone because the holders of the copyright to Gone with the Wind 
would not authorize a derivative work.162  Granted, mobs and copyright holders 
accomplish suppression through different means.  Mobs use physical force whereas 
authors use injunctive force, but the effect is the same.  Both methods prevent 
others from saying certain things anywhere.163  Indeed, copyright injunctions, since 
they have the force of federal law, are more effective than mobs at preventing 
someone from speaking, since the coercive power of the federal government enjoys 
the legitimacy of that government. 
A copyright regime that permits injunctions effectively empowers citizens to act 
as private censors of creative speech that they do not like.  This danger is 
compounded when a relatively small number of large entities hold the copyright to 
a great deal of works.164
 
 Furthermore, mob and injunctive suppression of speech 
 
 158. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1145. 
 159. Id. at 1180. 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
 161. Note, “Recoding” and the Derivative Works Entitlement:  Addressing the First Amendment 
Challenge, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1488, 1493–94 (2005) (discussing the First Amendment problems with 
“recoding” cultural works). 
 162. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, injunction vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001).  For a detailed 
First Amendment critique of that district court holding, see generally Rubenfeld, supra note 3. 
 163. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 29. 
 164. Professor Paul Goldstein has argued that there are serious First Amendment dangers when 
entities hold large numbers of copyrights, thus giving them a quasi-censorial power over culture in much 
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are both distinguishable from the situation where a private landowner kicks 
someone off her property for saying something she does not like, which is perfectly 
acceptable under First Amendment principles.165  A copyright injunction prevents 
the enjoined speaker from using a particular form of expression anywhere.  
Similarly, the antiabolitionist mobs sought to keep abolitionists from speaking 
anywhere.  When a dissenter is prevented from speaking anywhere, the public at 
large is effectively prevented from hearing his speech.  In contrast, an owner of 
private property may remove a speaker from her property because of the content of 
his speech without preventing the public at large from hearing what he has to say.  
The principle that makes the distinction between these cases meaningful is the 
distinction between the public and the private.  The struggle of abolitionist speech 
before the Civil War made this principle relevant to the First Amendment.166  The 
post Civil War First Amendment abhors the silencing of public dissent. 
An opponent of this view could also draw a distinction between copyright 
injunctions and mob suppression of abolitionist speech on the grounds that the 
antiabolitionist mobs silenced their foes with violence, whereas copyright enables 
rights holders to use the legitimate power of the state to silence infringers.  Even 
the promoters of the strong natural rights conception of free speech during the press 
burning controversy contemplated that free speech could be abused and that its 
abuses could be remedied by legal process.  For example, during the Lovejoy 
controversy, the Reverend Edward Beecher, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s brother, 
proposed a series of resolutions, declaring: 
that the free communications of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights 
of man and every citizen may freely write, speak, and print on any subject, being 
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.  The question of abuse must be decided solely 
by a regular civil court, and in accordance with the law and not by an irresponsible 
and unorganized portion of the community.167 
Under this theory, the infringement of a copyright holder’s derivative right 
would be an abuse of the right of free speech, and thus could be remedied by the 
appropriate copyright action.  However, this theory discounts the importance of the 
struggle for free speech to the great national debate over the question of whether or 
not our country will permit slavery to exist.  That struggle altered the concept of 
“the freedom of speech” to which the First Amendment refers.  The violence with 
which Southern states and Southern mobs attacked those who spoke out against 
slavery spurred abolitionists and their friends to develop a stronger conception of 
free speech.168  It is true that they sought to replace the violence directed toward 
 
the same way that the Stationers’ Company controlled the entire book trade before the Expiration of the 
Licensing act and the passage of the Statute of Anne.  Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 
supra note 1.  See also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (explaining the First Amendment dangers of 
concentration of copyrights in a small number of large holders). 
 165. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 29. 
 166. See Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy, supra note 5, at 1182. 
 167. Id. at 1141. 
 168. Id. at 1151–52. 
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them with principled discussion.169  However, the devolution of Southern society as 
its public forum contracted also convinced them, and ultimately American society 
as a whole, that a stronger conception of the freedom of speech was required in 
order for a democracy like the United States to remain healthy—a concept of 
freedom of speech designed to keep the public forum open to dissent.170
 
 Thus, the 
First Amendment principle that emerged from that struggle, and that was embodied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, is not merely that abuses of the freedom of speech 
must be dealt with through legal mechanisms, but also that dissenters must not be 
prevented from accessing the public forum, no matter whether they are prevented 
by legal process or by mob violence. 
Still, some scholars and Justices argue that the expanded copyright regime does 
not pose large First Amendment problems because doctrines internal to copyright 
evolved during its expansion that prevent it from abridging the freedom of 
speech.171  These two doctrines are the doctrine of fair use and the idea/expression 
dichotomy, and the argument is that they act as First Amendment safety valves.172  
Under the doctrine of the fair use defense, an otherwise infringing use of a 
copyrighted work will not be considered infringing if that use is “fair.”173  “Fair” 
use includes use “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research”.174  
In determining fair use, the courts must consult the following four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
The first problem with substituting fair use doctrine for First Amendment 
analysis is that the four factor balancing test is notoriously difficult to apply.  
Multifactor balancing tests are a particular problem for the First Amendment 
because uncertainty about how courts will rule in free speech cases harms a number 
of first amendment values.  The uncertainty caused by complex tests like the one 
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 171. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 n.24 (2003).  See also Robert Denicola, Copyright 
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 173. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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for fair use chills speech in normal times and gives courts too much leeway to 
capitulate to repressive public opinion in “pathological” times, that is, times where 
dissent is being stamped out by the majority of the public and the First Amendment 
is needed most.175 
But, more fundamentally, the outcome of fair use analysis often turn on the 
factors in the fair use test that do not track First Amendment values.  For example, 
the subtle distinction between parody and satire, important for fair use analysis, 
renders fair use decisions viewpoint discriminatory.176  The amount of economic 
harm the copyright holder has suffered (the fourth factor), is often the most 
important part of the fair use analysis; but this factor does not advance First 
Amendment analysis at all, being narrowly concerned with the private economic 
interests of the copyright holder.177  Since fair use analysis does not track First 
Amendment values, and at times actually contradicts First Amendment doctrine, it 
would be better to abandon the faith that fair use is coextensive with the First 
Amendment and develop new doctrine to deal with the conflict between copyright 
statutes and the First Amendment. 
Similarly, the idea/expression dichotomy fails to adequately satisfy the First 
Amendment because the First Amendment is concerned with expression, not 
ideas.178  As Professor Jed Rubenfeld explains, in Cohan v. California the Supreme 
Court overturned the conviction of a man who had “Fuck the Draft” written on the 
back of his jacket, holding that the government was not justified in regulating the 
way the man expressed his idea.179  Cases overturning convictions for draft card 
and flag burning stand for the same principle.180  This principle, that government 
restrictions on the way one expresses ideas will be given careful scrutiny, makes 
good sense.  The persuasive force of many ideas depends on exactly how they are 
communicated, and  therefore to limit the First Amendment solely to the protection 
of ideas, but not expression, would prevent it from effectively protecting the 
“freedom of speech.”  This fact is particularly important to the theory that the First 
Amendment must protect the right of the people to “check” the abuse of power of 
members of the government.  If dissenting speech is to have any impact, it must be 
able to get the attention of the populace.  As Vincent Blasi puts it: 
The checking process depends on the continuing capability of a populace generally 
inattentive of public affairs, engaged almost exclusively in the pursuit of private 
satisfaction, to be mobilized to resist government officials who are abusing their 
power.  The kind of stimulus necessary to activate the political the United States 
 
 175. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, supra note 74, at 472–74 
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 176. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 17. 
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 179. 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971). 
 180. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 14–16. 
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involvement in Vietnam represents a paradigm example of the ‘speech’ with which 
the First Amendment is concerned.181 
Furthermore, the fact that it is unquestioned now that the First Amendment 
protects art underscores the importance of expression to the First Amendment, 
since the way art expresses ideas—if art can even be said to have anything to do 
with ideas at all—is essential to what it is.182 
In sum, the fact that a strong copyright regime promotes dissenting speech does 
not completely reconcile it to the post Civil War First Amendment.  It also must not 
enable private parties to act as censors of public speech and contract the public 
forum available to dissenters. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  A SHORT SKETCH OF DOCTRINAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
A full elaboration of the doctrinal consequences of this history is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but a brief examination of its application to the question of 
remedies for the infringement of copyright will clarify how this Nineteenth Century 
history applies to present day copyright debates.  Two principles emerge from this 
history:  (1) a strengthened copyright regime actually serves the transformed First 
Amendment by encouraging dissenting speech; (2) the Constitution abhors the 
closing off of the public forum to dissenting speech.  The ultimate question is how 
to read the Copyright Clause with the First Amendment today in a way that restores 
the harmony that existed at the founding.  Answering this question involves 
reconciling the two principles mentioned above. 
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the metaphor of copyright as 
an engine for the “marketplace of ideas” does not by itself resolve the tension 
between the clauses by holding that copyright measures that go beyond the 
“traditional contours” of the copyright regime will receive First Amendment 
scrutiny, implying that Copyright is not immune from the First Amendment.183  
However, the transformation of the First Amendment during the Nineteenth 
Century shows that the “traditional contours” test is not adequate to the task of 
reharmonizing the two clauses since it ignores how the values underlying the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment diverged.  While this Article does not 
aim to provide an exhaustive analysis of the doctrinal implications of this history, a 
few obvious consequences are apparent.  This history supports the arguments of 
scholars who argue that First Amendment principles require that the ability to 
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obtain copyright injunctions must be limited in some way.184 
The story of abolitionist speech shows both that the post Civil War First 
Amendment will not abide injunctions against public speech, especially when that 
speech is dissenting speech, but that important First Amendment values are 
vindicated when we ensure that authors are compensated for their works.  However, 
if the ability for authors to collect damages for dissenting, but infringing, uses of 
their works were eliminated, then these authors would be disincentivized from 
creating these important works in the first place.  Taking the incentives rationale for 
copyright seriously, Harriet Beecher Stowe would be less likely to write Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin if she knew that she would not be able to win damages from 
infringers that used her work in politically important ways—say, illegally copying 
it and freely distributing it in the South.  Thus, it is necessary to ensure the author 
some kind of compensation for political use of her work.  Changing copyright’s 
property rules into liability rules would appear to reconcile copyright’s free speech 
role of incentivising risk taking creators with the negative free speech demand that 
a forum for public dissent be preserved. 
Simply turning property rules into liability rules, however, is not an entirely 
satisfying solution, since imposing massive liability on someone who uses a 
copyrighted work publicly would chill their speech as much as an injunction 
would—perhaps more so.  What is needed is a solution that spreads the cost of 
protected speech that infringes copyright across society, so that creators are still 
compensated but the public forum remains open and robust. This kind of loss 
spreading scheme, perhaps a tax of some sort, would likely have to be a legislative 
innovation.  Thus, the history analysed in this Article suggests that the 
Constitutional Clause places a duty on lawmakers to use the copyright power in 
such a way that the public forum remains vibrant and open to dissent. Furthermore, 
given the difficulty of achieving this type of loss spreading within the existing 
copyright scheme, it is likely that lawmakers will have to stray outside the 
historical “core of copyright protection.”  Just as it is necessary to step outside the 
courtroom in order to understand the conflict between the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment, the resolution of that conflict will also require extrajudicial 
action. 
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